The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the policies of China in the fields of development aid and their implications for global governance. The paper takes a comprehensive perspective on the various facets of such policies from the institutional arrangement, to key features of China's aid policies in the different stages of China's domestic reform and in the relations with recipient countries from different regions. A comparative perspective is undertaken, both vertically, through time, to have a good understanding of the evolution of China's strategies and practices in the development aid, and horizontally, with respect to the reflections among traditional donors at the international level. The paper starts with an analysis of domestic political economy of China's foreign aid policy with an emphasis of institutional arrangement and role of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). It will then examine some new trends of international development policies of traditional donors and compare them with China's strategies and practices. The authors then draw some key features of China's aid policy by looking into its practices in three different regions (Africa, Asia and Latin America). The paper concludes with a summary and analysis of implications of China's foreign aid policy for global governance on international development.
Introduction
Global development governance is the subject of intense debates, particularly when UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain far off track in those poorest countries by 2015.
The question of aid effectiveness was raised, for with more than $2.3 trillion spent in foreign aid over the last half-century, there is no equivalent impact in reducing poverty and conflict.
1 One of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of international development aid, as argued by scholars and donors themselves, is the lack of harmonization among donors and recipients, among governmental donors and non-governmental organizations, and among traditional donors and emerging new donors of the developing world. It is true there is no single place today where all countries can both agree on the rules, and monitor their implementation. Rather, there are several places, with different strengthen and weakness, creating overlaps and gaps. Moreover, this eclectic set of arrangements scarcely merits the term of 'governance', as most norms are set by a limited club-like group, and the norms are only norms, not rules.
In contrast to the WTO and trade disputes, there is no formal monitoring, penalty, or reward mechanisms in the field of international development. A weak regime for international development carries major downsides. The top five problems are: support is not predictable; some countries are chronically under-aided as the crowds focus elsewhere; fragmentation of sources and earmarks piles up transaction burden and distorts national allocation decisions; governance, human rights and the environment are challenged where corruption sprawls; economic and job opportunities are wasted due to lack of supply capacity, infrastructure and effective market access overseas. 
I. Domestic Political Economy
China's international aid policy has evolved in a significant way in the past decades. The key principles, however, were formulated about half century ago. In 1964, the Chinese government declared "the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries"
(Annex I), the core content of which featured equality, mutual benefit and no strings attached, hence the basic principle for China's foreign aid was formulated. These principles are deeply rooted in China's domestic political economy at that time. These principles and practices in international aid have developed at the pace with changes of at home and at the international affairs.
In the first stage from 1950 to 1977, China carried out a headstrong communist political and economic system and was faced huge difficulties of international isolation and economic shortage. Unsurprisingly, China's aid policy was only focused on DPRK, Vietnam and several
African countries who shared the similar political stands. The aid was limited and mainly material assistance.
From 1978, China's foreign aid policy entered the second stage, as China launched its reform and opening-up campaign. At this stage, China steadily liberalized its economic and ushered market mechanism. With a weaken ideology of planned economy and a broader economic and political exposure to the international community, China strengthened assistance to the least developed countries (LDCs) and paid more attention to economic and long term effects of aid projects. More importantly, China learnt management skills from building joint ventures with enterprises from developed countries, and applied its own experiences to its own foreign aid policies, for instance, setting up joint ventures in recipient countries and diversifying its way of providing aid.
A declaration of establishing socialist market economy in 1992 is a game changer for China's international aid policy, stemming from drastic shift of domestic reforming from planned economy to market economy. In the People's Congress in March 1992, China announced clearly its objective of economic reforms is to establish a socialist market economy. This was the first time for the ruling communist party firmly put aside the orthodox of planned economy. China set up its direction of using market as an efficient institution to allocate resources in the economy, instead of planning, command and control. As a way to move forward market oriented reforms, China decided to speed up its negotiation process of join the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Institutional arrangement
The leading ministry for China's foreign aid is, as many have known, is the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). To be more specific, it is just a Department of Foreign Aid within the MOFCOM that takes charge of it. It is very different from many developed countries who has a relatively independent agency specialized in overseas development aid. What is division of labor among these ministries in formulating and implementing an aid project a real world? As Lancaster's study shows, the first step is that recipient governments and
Chinese embassies in the field often propose aid projects to the Chinese for funding-much like the "request-based" aid programs. 4 In order to strengthen the coordination of the departments concerned, the ministries of commerce, foreign affairs and finance officially established the country's foreign aid interagency liaison mechanism in 2008. In February 2011, this liaison mechanism was upgraded into an inter-agency coordination mechanism.
Role of state-owned enterprises
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Officially, SOEs are not part of the aid policy formulation process, but are believed to play an important role in recent years. According to the interviews we did with senior managers of selected SOEs who are involved in China's foreign aid, SOEs' intervention are made at three different stages: help recipient countries to prepare aid requests, conduct preliminary project assessment, and implement aid projects.
SOEs involvement in foreign aid is, firstly, driven by their interests in raw materials, such as oil, gas, minerals and timber, necessary to fuel its incredible growth machine 
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SOEs would affect China's foreign policies by some level since those SOEs are viewed as the pioneer overseas which could see the whole appearance of foreign works.
As we were told by the interviewees, China's SOEs would report their experiences and enquiries to officials, and provide some suggestions to relevant agencies to shape beneficial policies for them so that China's SOEs could own competitive advantages than others.
Some SOEs like China ExIm Bank have been worked closely with to MOFCOM and its offices in recipient countries. So they can help recipient countries make aid requests. Since they are also familiar with recipient countries' situation, they are often asked to conduct feasibility assessment. China Development Bank is now working on development strategies of selected African countries, which will then be translated into both aid requests and commercial projects that will be financed by the Bank.
II. New development of Western Donors
What are the Western efforts on improving the global governance for international development aid? Does China override those efforts?
According to the Washington Consensus
12
, the western financial donation has always accompany with the request that recipient countries have to comply with the principles which force them to reform or to improve the internal governance such as fiscal discipline, public expenditure priorities, interest rate liberalization…
Western countries are believed to take advantages of their overseas aid in goodwill to push those developing countries to liberalize or to reform their institutional system. Western donors view Washington Consensus as a manner to reach the objective of reducing poverty in recipient countries, however, decades of controversy over the Washington Consensus have raised many doubts about whether the economic conditions that often accompany aid always good for development 13 . Nowadays, some of those least developing countries begin to turn to China for "unconditional" assistance and it becomes a key competitor for Western countries in recent years. 
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We will try to analyze a few main objectives of Western aid program as follows, and see if China overrides the Western efforts.
Humanitarian Concerns
Humanitarian concerns drive both short-term assistance in response to crisis and disaster as well as long-term development assistance aimed at reducing poverty, hunger, and other forms of human suffering brought on by more systemic problems. Providing assistance for humanitarian reasons has generally been the least contested purpose of aid by the American public and policymakers alike 14 . However, according to the studies of Global Public Policy Institute, China is believed to prevent itself from integrating into the multilateral humanitarian aid system. In the past, China's international humanitarian assistance mainly followed the noncommittal stance that China characteristically displayed with regards to most areas of multilateral collaboration. China's monetary contributions to humanitarian assistance were low in absolute, as well as relative, terms compared to its overall gross domestic product. More In recent years, China is gradually adapting itself to international mechanism, for instance, during the Indian Ocean tsunami, China's assistance efforts were of an unprecedented size, placing it first amongst developing nations. Except for its quantitative increase of financial donation, for the first time, China channeled humanitarian donations through multilateral mechanisms, mainly UN agencies. It's a slight sign that China is gradually fitting into the international aid system, and emphasizing more on the humanitarian assistance. 
Education (Capacity Building)
The World Bank supports a wide range of capacity building interventions through its country lending and non-lending programs and dedicated corporate and Regional entities.
Between 1995 and 2004, the Bank provided some $9 billion in lending and close to $900 million in grants and administrative budget to support capacity building in Africa. The bulk of this support has been directed toward the public sector.
The Bank's traditional efforts in building public sector capacity focused primarily on creating or reorganizing government units and building individual skills. Aware of the limited impact of its support in the face of countries' still-weak public sector capacity, the Bank has progressively changed its approach over the past 10 years, such as broadening its support to include the strengthening of public institutions and the fostering of demand for public service improvements, adding new diagnostic tools to assess countries' capacities to manage their public financial resources and has increased the range of lending instruments for delivering its capacity Moreover, the consistent donation from China is granted as a supportive power to those corruptive and autocratic countries, which will definitely undermine the political reform of recipients.
To sum up, according to China's white paper indicating some key features of its aid policy and purposes, PRC government is seeking for the approaches to build up the selfdevelopment of the recipients without imposing any political conditions. Adhering to equality, mutual benefits, and common development while summarizing experiences, makes innovations in the field of foreign aid, and promptly adjusts and reforms the management mechanism, so as to constantly improve its foreign aid work.
There is no "one-size-fit-all" approach in the world for helping least developed countries;
China is aiming at creating a "China-style" manner for foreign aid to adapt to its own internal conditions. Though there is still long way ahead, China is trying hard to catch up the Western by its new approach.
III. Regional variations of China's Aid
According to Chinese government (Write paper), aid projects are funded with Grants, Chinese officials suggested that African countries are prioritized according to their needs. 46 To serve the "mutual interests" promote "going global" strategy, several paradigms of ChinoAfrican cooperation functions to facilitating investment. Intertwining with economic activities, the distinctive features contribute to the ambiguity of being considered as aid.
The plan of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) enacted under the Beijing Action Plan, from FOCAC 2006, started its first move in Zambian and Mauritius. The Zambian Special Economic
Zones, seated at the commodity rich Chambishi, is set to be strategic mining hub by drawing participation of large Chinese firms. 47 The other in Mauritius is entrenched to attract private firms in manufacturing. Both zones require large amounts of investment in infrastructure, within the zones and linking them to the port or regional markets. Reportedly, the China Exim Bank offered concessional loans for construction, which were carried out by Chinese companies. IV. Does China's aid make a real difference to development in recipient countries?
Chinese Aid delivered tangible project in agriculture, industry, economic infrastructure, public facilities, education, and medical and health care. Improving recipient countries' industrial and agricultural productivity, laying foundations for the economic and social development, and improving basic education and health care are the focuses of China's engagement.
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Poor infrastructure has been an impediment to economic development in many poor countries. The growth is constraint due to the lack of investment in infrastructure. Chinese firms with support of the state enjoy the "coalition engagements" across various sectors, which align to the long-term plan of Beijing to Africa's development. Once set a foothold, Chinese companies are likely to pursue other tenders in the host country. With an understanding of the market, modern equipments and machinery, they are competitive bidders in for large projects including funded by international institutions such as the World Bank, contributing to a lowering of costs.
63
Here are a few key positive lessons that can be drawn from the China's foreign aid in past decades.
Inexpensive tangible results
The strong focus of Chinese aid on infrastructure allows minimum embezzlement and corruption by rarely transferring cash to recipient government. Not being directed to recipient's national budget, aid is disbursed directly to Chinese contractors. With the domestic tender platform of the aid department, the tied element of aid doesn't appear to make the cost overflow. 
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Mozambique, some 3,500 technical experts were hired by western donors with a payment of $350 million each year, equal to the salaries of 400,000 local people. 64 The distinct practice of the Chinese also enabled a less likely brain drain from recipient bodies.
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Promoting productivity
China's aid policy explicitly demonstrates its intension of using subsidies to help foster investment by their own companies. Infrastructure, as a sector disengaged by traditional donors, is to be assisted by Chinese aid regime as well as to entrench China's commercial engagement.
The "Angolan Model" permits resource-backed loan finances the countries with controllable debt. The different vision on debt sustainability is referential to western donors. 66 Along its own path of development, China benefited from foreign investment initially in four special economic zones, which boosted productivity by introducing advanced technology and management.
Likewise, the African SEZs and the CADF deliver China's doctrine on promotion of production that lays the foundation of development.
Contrast to the favor of investing food trade by the west, Chinese agricultural investment is considered in line with addressing Africa's huger problems by introducing hybrid rice and promoting sustainable fishing. Heavy investment on agricultural infrastructure, such as dams and canals, expands arable field significantly.
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In the meantime, challenges are looming larger in the aid policy radar that are raised by international scholars and discussed among Chinese stakeholders.
The first challenge is about deviation from conditionality.
China's "non-interference" rhetoric is often used to justify its no-strings-attached foreign aid practice. Yet, the observers accused China of giving blind support to "rogue states". Officials The second issue is about tied aid and little spilling over effects.
Noticeable projects-roads, railways, telecommunication networks-are under construction of Chinese firms. In other words, most of Chinese aid is tied, a practice the members of OECD-DAC agreed to move away from progressively, due to that tied aid increases the cost and requires larger bureaucracies on sides of donor as well as recipient. 72 Generally, the aid department of MOFCOM or Eximbank disburses to the contractor after the recipient confirmed the progress in line with the contract. 73 The Eximbank states, as concessional-loan-funded projects, "In principle, no less than 50% of total procurement shall be made in China".
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are also distant socially, often barricaded physically from neighboring communities by setting up razor wire, arousing suspicion and leading to isolation. 75 In a word, the "spilling over effect" of Chinese aid is little in economic and social respect.
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The third major question is the risks of re-indebting poorest countries.
The multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI) which dealt with the HIPC countries debt to multilateral institutions resulted in a relief of $43 billion. 77 The fact that China is now offering new loans to these debt relieved countries is seen free-riding on the established donors' debt relief programme and creating new problem for the future of the recipient countries. In 2008, the IMF expressed its concern on a $9 billion Chinese package, consisting of zero-interest, concessional and commercial-rate loan, to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Meanwhile, a write-off of a $12.3 billion loan was under negotiation within MDRI framework. Doubting DRC's debt sustainability on Chinese offer, and worried by its guarantee of prior repayment to China, the IMF and the World Bank pushed a renegotiation. Eventually, the IMF concluded that the downsized $6 billion loan had become "consistent with debt sustainability".
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The fourth concern is transparency and lack of cooperation. 
IV. Conclusion
China's foreign aid is rooted in its domestic political economy. The size of its aid is driven by the national economic strength, soaring from the year of 2000 when China speeded up its economic growth. The composition of its aid and the mechanism how aid is delivered are also linked with its political and economic model. That is, the formality of aid is more diversified.
China use regional and multilateral channels more frequently in delivering its aid in addition to traditional bilateral aid.
China's aid has de facto close linkages with commerce interests largely due to two factors.
The first factor is that MOFCOM is the leading agency in charge of China's foreign aid policy. It traced back to the early years of PRC when China's aid was mainly materials and all international flows of materials were controlled by MOFCOM. Different from many western countries, China does not have an independent agency that is responsible for international Page28 development. The second factor is the political and historic relations between SOEs and the government. Driven by demands for both natural resources and export market, SOEs are actively involved in influencing China's aid policy by helping recipient countries to make aid request and conducting feasibility assessment of proposed aid project.
In the contrast to its emphasis on economic activities and physical infrastructures, Chinese aid on social and human sectors remains modest. Traditional donors' focus on social and human sectors such as water sanitation, primary education, health service, gender equality etc. which are expected to have direct impact on the achievement of the millennium development goals. 83 The different but associated paradigms of aid put forwards a promising picture of aid cooperation between China and traditional donors, and in the end can contribute to conductive and effective global governance on international aid.
For China, there is a room to improve its aid policy from three aspects. Firstly, China shall provide more detailed data on allocation of aid, as well as information on basis of loan package.
The White Paper on Aid Policy is a very good first step and more detailed reports shall be made 
